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THE EXPERT ON FOREIGN LAW*
GEORGE S. CARTERt

Courts of one state do not, as a general rule, take judicial
notice of the law of a foreign country. Ordinarily, when a litigant
relies upon such foreign law as the basis of his claim or defense,
he must plead and prove it.'
The methods of such proof are stated as follows in Rule 44,
C (f), Colo. Rules of Civil Procedure.
A printed copy of a statute, or other written law....
of a foreign country, or a printed copy of a proclamation,
edict, decree or ordinance by the executive power thereof,
contained in a book or publication purporting or proved to
have been published by the authority thereof, or proved
to be commonly admitted as evidence of the existing law
in the judicial tribunals thereof, is presumptive evidence
of the statute, law proclamation, edict, decree or ordinance. The unwritten or common law . . . of a foreign
country, may be proved as a fact by oral evidence. The
books of report of cases adjudged in the courts thereof
must also be admitted as presumptive evidence of the unwritten or common law thereof ....
(Italics supplied).
Thus Rule 44 (f) prescribes different methods of proof depending upon whether the law to be proven is written or unwritten. However, even as to the written law, the method prescribed is not the only one possible.
In Mosko v. Matthews,2 the Colorado Supreme Court-construing Sec. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure, predecessor of Rule
44C (f) -held that the provisions of the code relating to proof of
foreign laws do not prescribe exclusive methods of such proof, at
least in absence of seasonable objection, and that the statutes of a
"foreign" state (Oklahoma) were sufficiently proven by the testimony of a duly licensed practicing attorney of that state when
such testimony was uncontradicted.
But even when the text of the foreign statute is before the
court, it must have help from expert witnesses. In the words of
Dean Wigmore :3
No one doubts that the aid of a mere translator is
proper. But when a translation, if necessary, has been
made, is anything further allowable in the way of comment
* This article will be limited to the necessary qualifications of an expert
witness, called to prove by oral testimony or by affidavit the existence or the
meaning of a foreign law, i.e. the law of a foreign country, not that of a sister
state.
t Student, University of Denver College of Law.
220 Am. Jur., Sec. 178.
2 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930).
17 NVYIG-IORE ON EVIDENCE, Sec. 1953 (3d ed. 1940).
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on the text? The answer has always and properly been
that such aid may at any time be needed and may always
be offered. (Citing cases).
Assuming then that expert witnesses are needed to prove both
written and unwritten foreign law, we come to our problem: who
can properly qualify as an expert on foreign law?
Having found no Colorado case directly in point, we shall
have to consider the decisions of other jurisdictions.
As stated by Dean Wigmore, 4 "the main controversy is
whether a witness to foreign law must be by profession an advocate, attorney, or judge, or whether a layman, if he claims the
knowledge, may be trusted to speak as to the state of the law."
There is little doubt in our courts that a practicing attorney
of a foreign jurisdiction (country) will qualify as an expert of
the particular law.
FEDERAL COURTS:

In Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Company,5 where the
wife and children of a citizen of Texas fatally injured in Mexico
through the negligence of a Colorado corporation brought suit
based on the laws of Mexico, the Supreme Court of the United
States held in effect that the admission in evidence of the statutes
of a foreign country does not preclude the use, upon any matter
open to reasonable doubt, of the deposition of a lawyer of that
country, respecting the accepted and proper construction of such
statutes. Said Mr. Justice Holmes:
The defendant offered the deposition of a Mexican
lawyer as to the Mexican law. This was rejected, subject
to exception, seemingly on the ground that the agreed
translation of the statute was the best evidence. So no
doubt they were (sic), so far as they went, but the testimony of an expert as to the accepted or proper construction of them is admissible upon any matter open to reasonable doubt.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held O
that the law of Cuba was not sufficiently proven by the introduction in evidence of excerpts from its written laws, and that its
construction by the Cuban Courts should have been proved by the
testimony of a lawyer of that country.
In Hartzell v. United States,7 the testimony of a member of
the London, England, bar was admitted to identify certain statutes
of England.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in
Shapleigh v. Mier,8 that the law of Mexico
4 op. cit., Sec. 564.
5 194 U.S. 120, (1904).
'In re International Mahogany Co., 147 Fed. 147, (1906).
72 F. 2d 569 (8th Cir., 1934) (cert, den. 293 U.S. 621).
S83 F. 2d 673 (1936) (aff'd 299 U.S. 468).
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is foreign law to be proven as a fact when written by
production of copies of the Constitution and statutes, and
in other respects by the testimony of experts. The writing
are to be construed by the judge as other writings in evidence, but if uncertain in meaning or application evidence
of experts is again admissible to aid the construction.
The court however does not tell us what it means by "expert".
But as the opinion cites, among other cases, Slater v. Mexican Nat.
R. Co., supra, we assume that it had an attorney admitted to the
Mexican Bar in mind.
In a fairly recent case 9 the United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit seems to have been rather strict in its requirements
concerning the qualifications of an expert witness. Said the Court:
For us, Argentine law is a fact. With respect to that
fact, defendant introduced the testimony of an expert witness. He is an American and a member of the New York
Bar, and of the Bars of Cuba and Puerto Rico. He studied
civil law for forty years. He has a degree of Doctor of
Civil Laws from the University of Havana. He was a
judge in Puerto Rico for seven years, and a member for
two years of a commission that drafted new legislation
for Cuba. He had studied Argentine law, and is the
author of a digest of that law appearing in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory.... He is authorized to practice in no Latin-American countries except Cuba, but can
give advice in other such countries .

.

. The judge is not

bound to accept the testimony of a witness concerning the
meaning of the laws of a foreign country, especially when,
as here, the witness had never practiced in that country.
It is a little hard to see why the admission or the lack of admission to practice in the foreign country should make any difference as to the weight of the expert's testimony, where-as herethe expert seems to be better qualified than most members of the
Bar of the particular foreign country. Unless the court only meant
to say what is true, in general, as to all expert testimony, i.e. that
it is just one kind of evidence and that the judge is not bound to
follow it.
STATE COURTS:

Some state decisions throw even more light on our problem
than the federal cases just cited.
Thus in an early case 10 a Spanish lawyer, who had practiced
law in Cuba, and at the time of the trial was an attorney in New
York, was allowed to testify as to the laws regulating partnership
in Cuba.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in an action in South
Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F. 2d 434 (2nd Cir., 1949).
' 0 Barrows v. Downs, 9 R.I. 446 (1870).
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Carolina based upon a tort allegedly committed in Mexico, held a
deposition of a Mexican lawyer, who had practiced law for 50 successive years. in Mexico, construing sections of the Mexican Civil
Code in evidence which the trial judge deemed applicable on question of liability, competent to prove Mexican law."
In Pringle v. Gibson, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
said in a dictum that an expert is "a competent witness learned in
the law of that jurisdiction." No mention of being a member of the
Bar was made, and it does not appear from the opinion as reported
whether the expert testifying in the case was a member of the
Canadian Bar, the law of Canada ha~ing been in issue.
Two recent cases before the District Court of Appeals, Second
District, Division 1, California, involved questions of proof of
foreign law. In People v. McGrath (In re Miller's Estate) ,'13 three
experts on German law were called. The first was a German national.
He studied law in this country at Harvard and Columbia Law Schools and in 1907 was appointed a judge of the
County Court at Berlin where he served for a year and a
half. For the next 10 years he was an assistant in both
the Prussian Department of Justice and the Federal Department of Justice and also a Justice of the Court of
Appeals of Berlin ... From 1932 he practiced law in Berlin until approximately the time of trial herein...
The second expert was
since 1939 the Foreign Law Librarian of the Los Angeles
County Law Library, who received a Doctor of Laws
degree at the University of Wuerzburg in 1933, then entered the Bavarian State Preparatory Service for Jurists
in 1933 ...
The third expert
had studied at the Universities of Berlin, Freiburg, and
Breslau, had experience in law offices, with the public
prosecutor, and then passed an examination which entitled him to become a judge or a practicing attorney
...
practiced law in Germany for many years ...
No question was being raised, and none could have been, as to
the qualification of these experts.
However, in the other case before the same court, 14 one of the
above three experts testified as to Norwegian law. The foreign
law librarian of the Los Angeles County Law Library
testified that he was a graduate of the University of
Wuerzburg, Germany, where he received his Doctor of
Rauton v. Pullman Co., 191 S.E. 416, 183 S.C. 495 (1937).
-2195 A. 695, 135 Me. 297, reh. den. 197 A. 553, 135 Me. 512 (1937).
230 P. 2d 667 (1951).
1' Comstock v. Johnson, 223 P. 2d 105 (1950).
"

13
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Laws and Referendar degrees covering German Law and
Civil Law; that in his capacity as foreign law librarian he
was asked questions concerning foreign law (in different
courts) ... that he was familiar in general with the law of
Norway . .. He further testified that he had never lived
in Norway; that he did not speak the Norwegian language
...
that he could read with the aid of a dictionary Norwegian ...
The court held that
the qualification of a witness to testify as an expert is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
where there is no showing of a clear abuse of that discretion, the ruling of that court will not be disturbed on appeal (citing cases), nor will the ruling be disturbed if
there is any substantial evidence to support it (citing
cases). In view of the qualifications of (the expert) as
hereinabove set forth, this court cannot say as a matter
of law that a clear abuse of discretion occured in the
trial court. And while residence within the jurisdiction
of Norway and firsthand observation of the customs of
the country might go to the weight of (the expert's) testimony, it does not go to its admissibility and the position of appellant that the lack thereof disqualified (the
witness) as expert witness is untenable. (Italics supplied.)
The Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County went
rather far in 1939 15 by accepting "an affidavit of an experienced
German lawyer" as to the powers of a certain official in Germanoccupied Czechoslovakia. "In the absence of proof to controvert
this statement of the law," said the court, "the Court will accept
it as a fact." The great advantage of possible cross-examination
of the expert does not exist, of course, when affidavits are used,
but this question lies outside the limited scope of this article.
The Supreme Court of Onondoga County (New York), in a
good orthodox case, 16 accepted the testimony of a "witness who
had been admitted to and practiced as a barrister in the Kingdom
of Italy ... as to the meaning and import of (the) Italian Statute".
Some 20 years earlier, the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court held that an expert on foreign law need not
necessarily be a lawyer. In Masocco v. Schaaf,1 7 where the validity
of an Italian religious marriage was in issue, one party introduced
the testimony of a New York attorney who "stated that he has
familiarized himself with the Italian law, but who apparently has
not been admitted to practice in Italy"; the deposition of a solicitor and barrister in Italy; the deposition of another witness who
"Stern v. S. S. Steiner, Inc., 12 N.Y.S. 2d 44 (1939).
"Fusco v. Fusco, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 286 (1951).
1-254 N.Y.S. 439, 234 App. Div. 181 (1931).
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had served as vice consul and holds the degree of doctor of law
from the University of Milano, and the deposition of an Italian
avvocato. The other party called the secretary of the Italian consulate of the city of Buffalo as a witness, who "testified that he
knew the Italian law very well, but was not a lawyer; that he was
familiar with the requirements of a legal marriage in Italy," etc.
The court said, inter alia:
Whether, in any case a witness is qualified to speak
as an expert is a fact to be determined by the courts upon
the trial preliminary to his testifying, and ordinarily the
decision of the trial court on this point, when there are
any facts to support it, is not open to review in this
court... The witness (the secretary of the consulate) in
his official capacity, was competent to testify and express
an opinion as to the validity of the marriage in question.
His official duties naturally require considerable familiarity with Italian law affecting persons of Italian nationality
and residence, rendering him peculiarly qualified to speak.
And the court further stated that the opinion of the first
party's witnesses has no more weight than the opinion of the
second party's witness, i.e. the secretary of the Consulate.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, made an
interesting pronouncement as to the weight to be accorded to such
expert testimony. In Olijan v. Lublin,18 it said:
Instead of producing printed copies of the particular (Yugoslav) statutes relied upon, she (plaintiff) called
as a witness one X, a member of the Bar of Akron, Ohio,
who has never been admitted to the practice of law in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This witness was permitted to
testify as to his opinion of what the rules of law are in
Yugoslavia as to the recording of vital statistics. This
method of establishing the laws of a foreign country is
permissible if the witnesses called are qualified. The
testimony which was given to support the qualifications
of Mr. X is, to say the least, meager. Having visited
Yugoslavia for two short periods of time and having
scanned a law book or two at the Yugoslav Embassy in
Washington would hardly qualify even a practitioner at
the Ohio Bar as an expert on the laws of such foreign
country. The witness' testimony is therefore of little or
no value whatever. Generally, one who is presented as
an expert to testify as to the law of another state or foreign country, is a practitioner of that state or country
or because of his position he has had a reasonable opportunity to acquaint himself with its provisions.
,50

N.E. 2d 264, (1943).
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There are a few other cases on the subject, but to cite them
would not seem to add anything new to the picture.
In conclusion, it may be stated that (1) the qualifications of
the expert on foreign law must be established to the satisfaction
of the trial court, (2) a witness who is or has been a practicing
attorney in the foreign jurisdiction, the law of which is to be
proven, is generally competent, and (3) even a layman can testify
if he appears to the satisfaction of the court to be well informed
as to the foreign law in question.

LEGISLATION CAUSES CHANGES IN
COUNTY COURT RULES
The Denver County Court, of its own motion, has made
changes in its Rules which became effective on June 1, 1953. These
amendments are set out below.
The amendment to Section 2 of Rule X, is a direct result of
the passage of Senate Bill No. 221, amending Section 217 of Ch.
176 and the same sort of rule is expected to be adopted by other
county courts throughout the state. As is apparent, both amendments were made in an effort to cooperate with the Attorney General's Office.
1. Section 2 of Rule X is amended by the addition of the
following paragraph:
Whenever in a decedent's estate it appears that there
is an unknown heir, legatee or devisee, or that the whereabouts of any heir, legatee or devisee is unknown, or that
there is no person qualified to receive a legacy, bequest
or distributive share from the estate, then a copy of the
final report of the fiduciary shall be served on the Attorney General of the State of Colorado, in person or
by registered mail, and the Attorney General shall have
ten days within which to file objections thereto.
2. The following rule is added:
Rule XXIV. NOTICE REQUIRED WHERE NONRESIDENCY ALLEGED.
Whenever a petition is filed requesting probate of
an alleged foreign will, or whenever a petition is filed
requesting transfer of a lodged will to another jurisdiction (or whenever in any other probate proceeding in
this court an allegation of non-residency is material to
the relief sought), a copy of such petition shall be served
on the Attorney General of the State of Colorado by
the petitioner, in person or by registered mail, and the
Attorney General shall have ten days within which to
file written objections.

